feat(bootloader_support): Support Secure Boot using ECDSA-P384 curve

This commit is contained in:
harshal.patil
2025-04-29 01:53:24 +05:30
parent 55f693d4dd
commit 476f8f6f51
21 changed files with 333 additions and 86 deletions
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#if !CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_LINUX
#include "rom/secure_boot.h"
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V1_ENABLED
#if !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_BOOT) || !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_ON_UPDATE) || !defined(CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS)
#error "internal sdkconfig error, secure boot should always enable all signature options"
@@ -33,7 +32,11 @@ extern "C" {
Can be compiled as part of app or bootloader code.
*/
#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ECDSA_KEY_LEN_384_BITS
#define ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN 48
#else /* !CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ECDSA_KEY_LEN_384_BITS */
#define ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN 32
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ECDSA_KEY_LEN_384_BITS */
/* SHA-256 length of the public key digest */
#define ESP_SECURE_BOOT_KEY_DIGEST_SHA_256_LEN 32
@@ -197,7 +200,8 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *imag
/** @brief Verify the secure boot signature appended to some binary data in flash.
*
* For ECDSA Scheme (Secure Boot V1) - deterministic ECDSA w/ SHA256 image
* For RSA Scheme (Secure Boot V2) - RSA-PSS Verification of the SHA-256 image
* For RSA Scheme (Secure Boot V2) - RSA-PSS Verification of the SHA-256 image digest
* For ECDSA Scheme (Secure Boot V2) - ECDSA Verification of the SHA-256 / SHA-384 (in case of ECDSA-P384 secure boot key) image digest
*
* Public key is compiled into the calling program in the ECDSA Scheme.
* See the apt docs/security/secure-boot-v1.rst or docs/security/secure-boot-v2.rst for details.
@@ -240,13 +244,13 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig
/** @brief Verify the secure boot signature block for Secure Boot V2.
*
* Performs RSA-PSS or ECDSA verification of the SHA-256 image based on the public key
* Performs RSA-PSS or ECDSA verification of the SHA-256 / SHA-384 image based on the public key
* in the signature block, compared against the public key digest stored in efuse.
*
* Similar to esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(), but can be used when the digest is precalculated.
* @param[in] sig_block Pointer to signature block data
* @param[in] image_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer holding SHA-256 hash.
* @param[out] verified_digest Pointer to 32 byte buffer that will receive verified digest if verification completes. (Used during bootloader implementation only, result is invalid otherwise.)
* @param[in] image_digest Pointer to 32/48 byte buffer holding SHA-256/SHA-384 hash.
* @param[out] verified_digest Pointer to 32/48 byte buffer that will receive verified digest if verification completes. (Used during bootloader implementation only, result is invalid otherwise.)
*
*/
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_sbv2_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest);